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1. Introduction
Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem [11] asserts that neither Peano Arithmetic, nor any consistent extension of it,
can prove a theorem afﬁrming its own self-consistency under Hilbert deduction. There have been numerous generalizations
and extensions of Gödel’s seminal result [1–4,6–9,15,19,23,24,28,30–36,38,40,41,43,44,46,48,50,52,54]. For example, Solovay
[36] has combined the work of Nelson, Pudlák andWilkie–Paris [25,31,46] to establish that essentially no axiom system that
recognizes Successor(x) = x + 1 as a total function (and which treats addition and multiplication as 3-way relations) can
prove a theorem afﬁrming its own consistency under the conventional paradigm of Hilbert deduction.
In 1981, Paris andWilkie [28] noticed that it was an open questionwhether the axiom system I0 did satisfy the Second In-
completeness Theorem for semantic tableaux andHerbranddeduction. Interestingly at the same time, Paris–Wilkie observed
that there was an available solution to this problem for Hilbert deduction. Thus, I0 + Exp is unable to prove the Hilbert
consistency of even an axiom system as simple as Q [46]. Subsequently. Adamowicz–Zbierski [1,3] showed that I0 + 1
was unable to verify its Herbrand consistency, andWillard [48,50] developed an alternate variant of the Adamowicz–Zbierski
formalism that showed at least one type of natural encoding of the I0 axiom system would satisfy the semantic tableaux
version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
On 16 November 2005, we received a fascinating email communication from L.A. Kołodziejczyk about this subject (which
was an outgrowth out of some conversations he had with Zoﬁa Adamowicz and Konrad Zdanowksi). It observed that there
are two natural formalisms for axiomatizing I0, henceforth called Ax-1 and Ax-2. Both shall take the Tarski–Mostowski–
Robinson axiom system Q as their starting base. In a context where φ(x, y) is a 0 formula, these formalisms will use,
respectively, Eqs. (1) and (2) to denote their induction schemes.
∀x { { φ(x, 0) ∧ ∀y [ φ(x, y) ⇒ φ(x, y′) ] } ⇒ ∀y φ(x, y) } (1)
∀x ∀z { {φ(x, 0) ∧ ∀y ≤ z [φ(x, y) ⇒ φ(x, y′) ] } ⇒ ∀y ≤ z φ(x, y) } (2)

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Kołodziejczyk noticed that logically equivalent axiom systems, such as Ax-1 and Ax-2, do not necessarily have the same
properties with regards to the semantic tableaux and Herbrandized versions of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. Thus,
Kołodziejczyk’s email askedwhether [50]’s semantic tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness Theoremwill generalize
forAx-2’s unconventional induction scheme? It also inquired towhat extent aregeneralizationsof theSecond Incompleteness
Theorem germane to Herbrand deduction? One reason the second question is especially intriguing is that Kołodziejczyk
demonstrated in [18,19] that there exists bounded arithmetics where Herbrand consistency and tableaux consistency are
provably not logically equivalent.
One part of our answer to this question had appeared in the separate paper [55]. It explained how our prior results about
Ax-1’s semantic tableaux incompleteness properties have direct generalizations for Ax-2.
A second type of answer to Kołodziejczyk’s stimulating open question will appear in this paper. We will prove that there is
a third type of axiomization of I0, called Ax-3, which is logically equivalent to Ax-1 and Ax-2, but which has the property
that an extension of Ax-3 is capable of recognizing its own Herbrand consistency.
This last result is likely to raise almost as many questions as it does answer. This is because there are many potential
logically equivalent axiomizations for I0. Thus, one may ask for which potential particular axiomizations α for I0 do the
Questions (1) and (2) below have a positive answer?
(1) Are all extensions of α ’s axiomization for I0 unable to prove a theorem verifying their own semantic tableaux
consistency?
(2) Likewise, are all extensions of α ’s axiomization for I0 unable to prove a theorem verifying their own Herbrand
consistency?
Since theSecond IncompletenessTheoremgeneralizes formost typesof axiomsystems, it is of course reasonable toconjecture
that most of the answers to the Questions 1 and 2 (above) will be in a positive direction. However, the point of this article is
that an automatic “yes” response to Questions 1 and 2 cannot be always secured. Thus, Kołodziejczyk [18,19] has shown that
Herbrand consistency and semantic tableaux consistency are not always equivalent to each other, and the current article will
actually construct a particular formalization of I0, called Ax-3, that manages to evade at least Question 2’s Herbrandized
version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
2. The deﬁnition of a new version of I0
This section will deﬁne the Ax-3 axiomatization for I0 and provide the formal statement of our main theorem (which
will be subsequently proven in Sections 3 and 4). As the reader examines the formal deﬁnitions in the current section, it
should be kept in mind that Ax-3 was deliberately endowed with an unconventional method for axiomatizing I0 so that
its formalismwill evade the Herbrandized version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. (Moreover because of a technical
difference between the deﬁnitions of Herbrand consistency and semantic tableaux consistency, it should be kept inmind that
Ax-3’s evasion of the Second Incompleteness Theorem under a Herbrandized deﬁnition of consistency does not generalize
for semantic tableaux deduction.)
In our discussion, a formula will be called R0 iff it has a structure similar to a 0 formula (appearing in for example the
Hájek–Pudlák textbook [13]) except that its bounded quantiﬁers, “∀ v ≤ T” and “ ∃ v ≤ T”, are now disallowed from using
the conventional arithmetic functions of addition and multiplication in their terms T . Instead, the terms of a R0 formula
will employ only the maximum function as the only permissible operator to deﬁne a variable’s bounded range. (Arithmetic
functions are allowed to appear elsewhere in the body of aR0 formula.) Thus, Eq. (3) is an example of a
R
0 formula, and (4)
is an example of a0 formula that is not
R
0.
∀ p ≤ Max(x, y) [ ( p + y ≤ x + 2*y) ∨ ( p*y ≤ y*y*y)] (3)
∀ p ≤ x*y [ ( p + y ≤ x + 2*y) ∨ (p*y ≤ y*y*x)] (4)
Let us say a formula isR1 iff it can bewritten as ∀ v1 ∀ v2 ... ∀ vn φ(v1, v2, ... , vn)where φ(v1, v2, . . . , vn) is aR0 formula.
Each of Ax-1, Ax-2 and Ax-3 will contain a common set of nine R1 axioms, called Q0 and listed below. The main purpose of
Q0 will be to deﬁne the constructs of addition, multiplication, integer-successor, maximum and also = and ≤.
1 = 0′ ∧ 2 = 1′ ∧ 0 = 0 ∧ 0′ /= 0 ∧ 0 ≤ 0 ∧ ¬ [ 0′ ≤ 0 ] (5)
∀ x ( x + 0 = x ∧ x · 0 = 0 ∧ x · 1 = x ) (6)
∀x ∀y ( x′ = y′ ⇐⇒ x = y ) (7)
∀x ∀y ( x ≤ y ⇐⇒ ( x′ ≤ y ∨ x = y ) (8)
∀x ∀y x · y′ = (x · y) + x ∧ x + y′ = (x + y)′ (9)
∀x ∀y ∀z [ x = y ∧ y = z ] ⇒ [ x = z ∧ z = x ] (10)
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∀x ∀y ∀z [ x = y ∧ y ≤ z ] ⇒ x ≤ z (11)
∀x ∀y ∀z [ x = y ∧ z ≤ y ] ⇒ z ≤ x (12)
∀x ∀y ( x ≤ y ⇒ Max(x, y) = y ) ∧ ( y ≤ x ⇒ Max(x, y) = x ) (13)
In the context of the above deﬁnition for Q0, the Ax-1 and Ax-2 formalisms will be, respectively, deﬁned as the union of
Q0 with all the instances of the respective induction schemes in Eqs. (1) and (2), where φ(x, y) is a 0 formula. Similarly,
IR0 will be deﬁned as the union of Q0 with all instances of Eq. (2)’s induction schemas where φ(x, y) is
R
0.
This paragraphwill deﬁne a set ofR1 sentences, called Trivial-R, that has the property that I
R
0 + Trivial-R proves the same
set of theorems as themore conventional Ax-1 and Ax-2 axiomatization for I0. In our discussion, a tuple (a0, a1, a2, . . . , aN)




ai * (a0 + 1)i−1 AND a1 ≤ a0 ∧ a2 ≤ a0 ∧ ... aN ≤ a0 (14)
For a ﬁxed integer N, let SplitN( x , a0 , a1 , . . . , aN ) denote a
R
0 formula indicating (14) is satisﬁed.
For each of the arithmetic operators of + , * , Max, = and ≤, the axiom system Trivial-R will have available a family of
R0 predicates and
R
1 axioms for simulating the operations of these functions when they manipulate Split Representations
of integers. Thus for a ﬁxed triple (I, J, K), let MultI,J,K(a0, a1, ..., aI , b0, b1, ..., bJ , c0, c1, ..., cK) designate a 
R
0 predicate
simulating the action of integer multiplication when its input is the two split integers of (a0, a1, . . . , aI) and (b0, b1, . . . , bJ)
and its resultant is the multiplicative product of (c0, c1, . . . , cK). The accompanying 
R
1 axiom of Trivial-R that formalizes
this predicate will be:
∀ x ∀ y ∀ z ∀ a0 ∀ a1 ... ∀ aI ∀ b0 ∀ b1 ... ∀ bJ ∀ c0 ∀ c1 ... ∀ cK
{ [ SplitI(x, a0, ... , aI) ∧ SplitJ(y, b0, ... , bJ) ∧ SplitK(z, c0, ... , cK) ] ⇒
[ x*y = z ⇐⇒ MultI,J,K(a0, ... , aI , b0, ... , bJ , c0, ... , cK) ] } (15)
Likewise, Trivial-R will have available analogs of Eq. (15) to simulate addition, maximum, equality, and less-than-or-equals
among split integers. Thus, the predicates of AddI,J,K(a0, a1, . . . , aI , b0, b1, . . . , bJ , c0, c1, . . . , cK), Maxim
I,J,K(a0, a1, . . . ,
aI , b0, b1, . . . , b,c1, . . . , cK), Eq
I,J(a0, a1, . . . , aI , b0, b1, . . . , bJ) and LTE
I,J(a0, a1, . . . , aI , b0, b1, . . . , bJ)will be the
R
0 analogs
of MultI,J,K for these four structural relations. Their counterparts of Eq. (15)’s formal axiom will then be:
∀ x ∀ y ∀ z ∀ a0 ∀ a1 ... ∀ aI ∀ b0 ∀ b1 ... ∀ bJ ∀ c0 ∀ c1 ... ∀ cK
{ [ SplitI(x, a0...aI) ∧ SplitJ(y, b0...bJ) ∧ SplitK(z, c0...cK) ] ⇒
[ x + y = z ⇐⇒ AddI,J,K(a0...aI , b0...bJ , c0...cK) ] } (16)
∀ x ∀ y ∀ z ∀ a0 ∀ a1 ... ∀ aI ∀ b0 ∀ b1 ... ∀ bJ ∀ c0 ∀ c1 ... ∀ cK
{ [ SplitI(x, a0...aI) ∧ SplitJ(y, b0...bJ) ∧ SplitK(z, c0...cK) ] ⇒
[ z = Max(x, y) ⇐⇒ MaximI,J,K(a0...aI , b0...bJ , c0...cK) ] } (17)
∀ x ∀ y ∀ a0 ∀ a1 ... ∀ aI ∀ b0 ∀ b1 ... ∀ bJ [ SplitI(x, a0...aI) ∧ SplitJ(y, b0...bJ) ]
⇒ [ x = y ⇐⇒ EqI,J(a0...aI , b0...bJ) ] (18)
∀ x ∀ y ∀ a0 ∀ a1 ... ∀ aI ∀ b0 ∀ b1 ... ∀ bJ [ SplitI(x, a0...aI) ∧ SplitJ(y, b0...bJ) ]
⇒ [ x ≤ y ⇐⇒ LTEI,J(a0...aI , b0...bJ) ] (19)
Henceforth,Ax-3will denote theaxiomsystem IR0 + Trivial-R. Section3will prove thatAx-3proves the sameset of theorems
as Ax-1 and Ax-2.
Deﬁnition 1. Let α ⊇ β denote that α’s set of formal axioms includes all β ’s axioms. (This deﬁnition of “⊇ ” is stronger
than the more modest construct that α proves all β ’s theorems.) Also assuming α denotes a consistent axiom system
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and D denotes a deductive method, (α,D)will be called a Threshold for the Second Incompleteness Effect iff all consistent
extensions α* ⊇ α have the property that α* is unable to prove the consistency of its proofs using deduction method D.
Otherwise, (α,D) will be called an Anti-Threshold. (It means that some consistent α* ⊇ α can prove a theorem afﬁrming
its own consistency under deduction method D.)
Using Deﬁnition 1’s notation, the main theorem proven in this article will be that Ax-3 is an anti-threshold for the
Herbrandized version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. This means that there must assuredly exist some consistent
system α* ⊇Ax-3, where α* can prove a theorem afﬁrming its own Herbrand consistency.
3. Basic framework and underlying intuition
This section will have two purposes. It will formally prove Ax-3 proves the same set of theorems as Ax-1 and Ax-2, thus
establishing that Ax-3 is a permissible formal means for axiomatizing I0. It will also provide an intuitive explanation of
why Ax-3 is able to evade the Herbrandized version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem (by satisfying Deﬁnition 1’s
“anti-threshold” property for Herbrand consistency).
Theorem 1. Each of Ax-1, Ax-2 and Ax-3 prove the same set of theorems.
Proof sketch. It is well known Ax-1 and Ax-2 prove the same set of theorems. Thus to establish Theorem 1, we need only
show Ax-2 and Ax-3. also prove the same set of theorems.
Our proof will use the fact that Paris and Dimitracopoulos [26] have observed that in a model-theoretic sense, there is a 1-
to-1 correspondence between0 formulae and their equivalent representations in a
R
0 form. Letψ(x, y) denote an arbitrary
R0 formula. The Paris and Dimitracopoulos [26] result easily implies that for any integer k, it is possible to construct a 
R
0
formulaψ*(x, y0, y1, . . . , yk) that is its logical counterpart ofψ(x, y)under split representations for an integer.Moreprecisely,
it implies that one can map ψ(x, y) onto a R0 formula ψ
*(x, y0, y1, . . . , yk) such that the Ax-2 and Ax-3 representations of
I0 can both trivially prove the following property:
∀ x ∀ y ∀ y0 ∀ y1 ... ∀ yk
{ Splitk(y, y0, y1, . . . , yk) ⇒ [ψ(x, y) ⇐⇒ ψ*(x, y0, y1, . . . , yk) ] } (20)
Let SizeL(y0, y1, . . . , yk) denote a
R
0 formula indicating that (y0, y1, . . . , yk) represents an integer ≤ L. Then it is not hard
to show that Ax-3 can use its Trivial-R axioms to prove that the two0 formulae of ∃y ≤ xk ψ(x, y) and ∀y ≤ xk ψ(x, y)
are equivalent to the respectiveR0 formulae of:
∃ y0 ≤ x ∃ y1 ≤ x ... ∃ yk ≤ x Sizexk(y0, y1, ... , yk) ∧ ψ*(x, y0, y1, ... , yk) (21)
∀ y0 ≤ x ∀ y1 ≤ x ... ∀ yk ≤ x Sizexk(y0, y1, ... , yk) ⇒ ψ*(x, y0, y1, ... , yk) (22)
Thus by essentially applying n iterations of this technique (and its obvious analogs) to any initial 0 formula with n
bounded quantiﬁers, Ax-3 can transform an arbitrary0 formula into a provably equivalent
R
0 formula. It thus follows that
although the Ax-3 system contains technically only instances of Eq. (2)’s axiom schema forR0 formulae, it nevertheless has
an ability to formally prove as theorems all the remaining instances of Ax-2’s axiom schema for 0 formulae as well. (In
particular if φ(x, y) is a0 formula which is not
R
0 and if φ
*(x, y) is aR0 formula equivalent to φ(x, y), then Ax-3 can prove
a theorem verifying the validity of Eq. (2)’s axiom scheme for φ(x, y) by ﬁrst observing that this axiom scheme is valid for
φ*(x, y) and then observing the latter is equivalent to φ(x, y)’s axiom scheme.)
Hence although Ax-3 contains technically only a proper superset of Ax-2’s induction axioms as formal axioms within
its own induction schema, it has the ability to formally prove the validity of all of Ax-2’s axioms. The proof in the reverse
direction (establishing that Ax-2 can prove all Ax-3’s axioms) is straightforward because Ax-2 can easily prove all Ax-3’s
Trivial-R axioms. Hence, Ax-2 and Ax-3 will prove identical sets of theorems. 
Remark 1. Our proof that Ax-3 is an anti-threshold for the Herbrandized version of the Incompleteness Theoremwill appear
in Section 4. This result is quite surprising because there are of course many more generalizations of Gödel’s Second Incom-
pleteness Theorem available in the mathematical literature [1–4,6–9,15,19,23,24,28,30–36,38,40,41,43,44,46,48,50,52,54]
than there are published examples of boundary-case style exceptions to its formalism.
In order to explain intuitively the core idea about why our paper is able to achieve this surprising evasion of the Second
Incompleteness Theorem, it is helpful to let ϒn denote Eq. (23)’s 0 sentence. Note that this sentence is comprised of O(n)
logic symbols. It asserts that the variables v0 , v1 , v2 , . . . , vn , satisfy vi = 22i .
∃ v0 ≤ 2 ∃ v1 ≤ v0*v0 ∃ v2 ≤ v1*v1 ... ∃ vn ≤ vn−1*vn−1
v0 = 2 ∧ v1 = v0*v0 ∧ v2 = v1*v1 ∧ ... ∧ vn = vn−1*vn−1 (23)
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It is easy to see there exists some R0 sentence, called say ϒ
R
n , that is the counterpart of Eq. (23) written in a notation
using split integers. This sentence will indicate the existence of a sequence of split integers S0 , S1 , S2 , . . . , Sn , where Si
represents the quantity 22
i
.
However although they in some sense represent equivalent concepts, there is a fundamental difference between the 0




n . This difference is easiest to explain if one uses a logical language that has only 3
named constants, 0, 1 and 2, and if split integers are encoded as base 2 numbers. Then ϒRn will be encoded as a sequence of
at least 2n characters, but ϒn’s length has a sharply smaller O(n) magnitude. As a consequence of this distinction (and its
generalizations),we realized that one could formulate anaxiomsystemthatwas logically equivalent to themore conventional
encodings for I0, butwhichwasananti-threshold to theHerbrandizedversionof theSecond IncompletenessTheorem(using
Deﬁnition 1’s terminology).
In particular, it turns out that the exponential difference between the lengths of the0 sentenceϒn and its
R
0 counterpart
ϒRn plays a major role in understanding the central concept that motivated much of the research that stimulated the current
article. Thus, this paradigm (and its formal generalization for arbitrarily more complicated sequences of sentences) are used
by Section 4’s machinery in a much more sophisticated context to prove that it is feasible to construct awkward encodings
for I0 , similar to Ax-3, that are actual anti-thresholds to the Herbrandized version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
(A reader should not worry if he does not follow fully the intuitive idea, sketched in this paragraph, about the signiﬁcance of
logically equivalent statements that have exponentially different sizes in length. This is because a fully formalized proof of
our main theorem, that uses this effect, will be explored in great detail in the next section.)
4. Main analysis
Asentenceψ in thepropositional calculuswill be called anAnti-Tautology iffψ is unsatisﬁable (i.e.¬ψ is a tautology). Our
deﬁnition of Herbrand deduction will be identical to the deﬁnitions used by Adamowicz, Hájek–Pudlák and Kołodziejczyk
[1,13,19], except that wewill use a dual version of this deﬁnition that follows from DeMorgan’s Rule, where disjunctions are
replaced with conjunctions and where tautologies are replaced with anti-tautologies. In other words, our deﬁnition will use







Our deﬁnition of Herbrand deduction [14] will differ from its more conventional deﬁnitions by using the right (instead of
left) side of (24)’s identity. This change in notation is unnecessary, but it does help to considerably simplify our proofs.
Let denote an arbitrary prenex normal sentence such as the prototype below, whose open subcomponent is denoted as
ψ˜ .
∀ x1 ∃ y1 ∀ x2 ∃ y2 .... ∀ xn ∃ yn ψ˜ (x1, y1, ..., xn, yn) (25)




2 (x1, x2) ... f
ψ
n (x1, x2, . . . , xn) are new function symbols, Eq. (26) is called the Skolemization of
Eq. (25).
∀ x1 ∀ x2 .... ∀ xn ψ˜ [ x1 , fψ1 (x1) , x2 , fψ2 (x1, x2) , ... xn , fψn (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ] (26)
In a context where L is a logical language and α is an axiom system, we will let CL and FL denote the set of constant and
function symbols associated with L . Similarly, Fα will denote the set of “Skolemized” function symbols associated with α’s
axioms. Thus using (25) and (26)’s notation, let α denote a system of axioms 1 , 2 , 3 ... , and for an arbitrary index i






i , ... The Herbrandized Terms for this ordered pair
(α, L) will then be deﬁned to be the set of all terms generated by the constants from the set CL combinedwith the functional
operations from the set Fα ∪ FL.
A Herbrandized Instance of a Skolemized axiom is a sentence identical to this axiom except that all its universally
quantiﬁed variables are replaced by Herbrandized terms. For instance in a context where T1, T2, T3, ... are Herbrandized
terms, Eq. (27) is such an instance of (26)’s axiom:
ψ˜ [ T1 , fψ1 (T1) , T2 , fψ2 (T1, T2) , . . . , Tn , fψn (T1, T2, . . . , Tn) ] (27)
Let ⊥ denote the logical constant of FALSE. A Herbrandized Proof of ⊥ from the axiom system α is deﬁned as a ﬁnite
collection of Herbrandized instances of α together with a proof, in the pure propositional calculus, that the conjunction of
these instances is an anti-tautology.
Deﬁnition 2. Using our revised notation convention, the theorem ϒ will be said to have a Herbrandized Proof from the
axiom system β if and only if the union of the axiom system β with the added sentence¬ϒ produces a Herbrandized proof
of ⊥ .
More notation. Let us say that a function G( x1 , x2, . . . , xn ) is a Non-Growth Function iff G( x1 , x2, . . . , xn ) ≤
Max( x1 , x2, . . . , xn ). Deﬁne a set S of functions to be an Arithmetic Controlled Set iff S includes the arithmetic functions
Dan E. Willard / Information and Computation 207 (2009) 1078–1093 1083
of addition, multiplication and successor and all its other functions are non-growth functions. Also, deﬁne a term t to be
an Arithmetically Controlled Term iff t is a term that uses only the symbols of 0, 1 and 2 as its inputted constants and all
its function symbols come from some Arithmetic Controlled Set S. Thus if G1 and G2 are non-growth functions, Eq. (28)
represents an arithmetically controlled term.
G1[ (2 + 1)*(1 + 1) , 1 + 2 ] * G2( 2 + 2 + 0 , 2 + 2 + 1 + 0 ) (28)
Also, in a context where Ct and Ft denote the number of constant and function symbols in t, we will use the following
notation:
(1) MinG(t)will denote the quantity 2Ct+Ft .
(2) Val(t)will denote the quantity represented by the term t.
For example if G1(x, y) = |x − y| and G2(x, y) = Min(x, y) then Eq. (28)’s term t will have Val(t) = 3*4 = 12 and
MinG(t) = 225 (because t contains 12 function symbols and 13 constant symbols).
Lemma 1. Let t be an arithmetically controlled term which satisﬁes the inequality Val(t) ≥ 4. Then Val(t) < MinG(t).
Proof sketch. Suppose for some k ≥ 2, that Val(t) = 2k. Then it easy to see that t ’s maximally compressed representation
as an arithmetically controlled term is “ 2*2*.... 2”. Thus MinG(t) = 22k−1 > Val(t) = 2k is valid in this case because the
preceding product has k appearances of the constant 2 connected by k − 1 appearances of the multiplication symbol.
Moreover, it is easily proven that terms, which are not powers of 2, are never represented in a more compressed form than
the greatest power of 2 that they exceed. Thus Lemma 1 is valid for all terms where Val(t) ≥ 4. 
Deﬁnition 3. For a ﬁxed constant B > 0, a set S of functions is deﬁned to be a B-Bounded Arithmetic Set iff S includes the
arithmetic functions of addition, multiplication and successor and all its other functions G satisfy the constraint that
G(x1, x2, ... , xn) ≤ Max(x1, x2, ... , xn) when Max(x1, x2, ... , xn) < B (29)
Also,wewill say a term t is a B-BoundedArithmetic Term iff t is a term that uses only the symbols of 0, 1 and 2 as its inputted
constants and all its function symbols come from some B-Bounded Arithmetic Set S. Lemma 2 provides the generalization of
Lemma 1 for B-bounded arithmetic terms. Its proof is omitted because it is an easy generalization (see Footnote 1) of Lemma
1’s proof.
Lemma 2. Suppose that t is a B-bounded arithmetic term with MinG(t) < B and Val(t) ≥ 4. Then Val(t) < MinG(t).
Deﬁnition 4. Let denote theR1 sentence below whose
R
0 subformula is deﬁned by φ˜ (a1, a2, ..., an):
∀a1∀a2...∀an φ˜ (a1, a2, ..., an) (30)
For any B ≥ 1, Eq. (30) is called a B-Bounded ValidR1 sentence iff (31) is valid under the standard model of the natural
numbers
∀ a1 < B ∀ a2 < B ... ∀ an < B φ˜ ( a1, a2, . . . , an) (31)
Deﬁnition 5. An axiom system α will be said to satisfy the Canonical Arithmetic Condition when all α’s axioms are R1
sentences and they include Q0’s nine axioms (i.e. Eqs. (5)–(13)).
Deﬁnition 6. Let  denote a methodology for assigning Gödel numbers to Herbrand proofs (which are henceforth denoted
as P). Let us recall that MinG(t) was deﬁned by Item (1) in this section. Deﬁne  to be a Conventional Encoding Method
if (P) >MinG(t) whenever the proof P contains the Herbrand term t. (Such encodings are called “conventional” because
all usual methods for encoding Herbrand proofs satisfy (P) >MinG(t).)
Theorem 2. Suppose α is a canonical arithmetic axiom system consisting of B-Bounded ValidR1 sentences and again satisﬁes
Deﬁnition 6’s Conventional Encoding property. Then any Herbrand proof P of⊥ from the axiom systemα will satisfy the inequality
that (P) > B .
General comments about Theorem2 and its proof.At an intuitive level, Theorem2 can be viewed as a consequence of the
machineries of Lemma2 andDeﬁnitions 3–6. This is because the B-Bounded validity condition in Theorem2’s hypothesis can
be used to show that a Herbrand proof P of⊥must contain some term t where Val(t) ≥ B . In this context, the combination
of Lemma 2 and Deﬁnition 6 will imply that such a term will force P ’s Gödel number to exceed the lower bound of B.
1 The intuitive reason that Lemmas 1 and 2 have similar proofs is that arithmetically controlled terms and B-bounded arithmetic terms have precisely
identical growth rates until a construction process builds an intermediate object t with MinG(t) ≥ B .
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Amore detailed formal proof of Theorem 2 appears in Appendix A. It explains the precise role that Deﬁnition 3 and Lemma
2 play in establishing this theorem. Our recommendation is that a reader postpone examining Appendix A until after he
ﬁnishes the remainder of this section. It will explain the signiﬁcance of Theorem 2 by showing how it enables us to prove
the surprising result that the Ax-3 axiomatization for I0 is an anti-threshold for the Herbrandized version of the Second
Incompleteness Theorem. 
Theorem 3. For any arbitrary axiom system α and deduction method D, let Diagonal(α,D) and αD denote the following two
constructs:
A. Diagonal(α,D) will denote a logical sentence that states: “There is no proof (using deduction method D ) of the falsity
sentence ⊥ from the union of the axiom system α with this sentence Diagonal(α,D) (looking at itself).”
B. αD will denote the formal union of the axiom system α with the sentence Diagonal(α,D).
Let Diag(Ax-3) denote the special variant of Diagonal(α,D) where α = Ax-3 and D designates Herbrand deduction. Both these
two constructs and also αD are well deﬁned. Also, Diag(Ax-3) has aR1 encoding.
Abbreviated sketch of Theorem 3’s proof. As early as 1938, Kleene observed [17] that the Fixed Point Theorem implied
that a type of cousin of the sentence Diagonal(α,D) was well deﬁned. More recently, Willard [49,52] showed how
Diagonal(α,D) could be formally endowed with a 1 encoding under the conventional language of arithmetic. It is rea-
sonably straightforward to generalize [49,52]’s result to establish that Diag(Ax-3) also has a well deﬁnedR1 encoding (thus
completing Theorem 3’s proof). The remainder of this proof sketch will summarize the ideas from [49,52] for the beneﬁt of
those readers who are unfamiliar with this topic. Our discussion will employ the following notation:
(i) PrfDα ( t , p ) will denote a formula designating that p is a proof of the theorem t from the axiom system α using the
deduction method D.
(ii) ExPrfDα ( h , t , p ) will be a formula stating that p is a proof (using the deduction method D) of a theorem t from the
union of the axiom system α with the added axiom sentence whose Gödel number equals h .
(iii) Subst ( g , h )will denote Gödel’s classic substitution formula — which yields TRUE when g is an encoding of a formula
and h is an encoding of a sentence that replaces all occurrence of free variables in g with a mathematical term
formalizing the Gödel number for representing “g”.
(iv) SubstPrfDα ( g , t , p ) will denote the natural hybridizations of the constructs from Items (ii) and (iii) which yields
a Boolean value of TRUE exactly when there exists some integer h simultaneously satisfying both Subst ( g , h ) and
ExPrfDα ( h , t , p ).
Each of (i)–(iv) can be encoded asR0 formulaewhenα is any recursively enumerable axiom system. In particular, Appendices
C and D of [49] essentially established (see Footnote 2) that the ﬁrst three of these predicates can receiveR0 encodingswhen
one applies the theory of LinH functions from [13,21,56] in a reasonably routinemanner. In such a context, Eq. (32) illustrates
one possible R0 encoding for SubstPrf
D
α (g, t, p)’s graph. (It is equivalent to “ ∃ h [ Subst(g, h) ∧ ExPrfDα(h, t, p) ] ”, but Eq.
(32) is aR0 formula — unlike the quoted expression.)
PrfDα ( t , p ) ∨ ∃ h ≤ p [ Subst ( g , h ) ∧ ExPrfDα ( h , t , p ) ] (32)
Utilizing (32)’sR0 encoding forSubstPrf
D
α(g, t, p), it is easy to formulatea
R
1 encoding for theaxiomsentenceDiagonal(α,D).
Thus, let(g)denoteEq. (33)’s formula, and letN denote (g)’sGödelnumber. Then(N) is aR1 encoding forDiagonal(α,D).
∀ p ¬ SubstPrfDα( g , ⊥ , p )  (33)
Clarifying Comment. One should be somewhat cautious in interpreting the meaning of Theorem 3. It does not indicate
that Diag(Ax-3) is a logically valid statement under the standard model of the natural numbers. Rather, it merely indicates
Diag(Ax-3) is a well deﬁned R1 sentence. In order to establish prove that Diag(Ax-3) is also valid, we will need the added
force of Theorem 4 below.
Theorem 4. Let Ax-3* denote the union of the axiom system Ax-3 with the sentence Diag(Ax-3). Then Ax-3* is consistent. (Thus,
Ax-3 is an “anti-threshold” for the Herbrandized version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem under Deﬁnition 1’s notation
convention.)
Proof of the consistency property of Ax-3*. Suppose for the sake of establishing a proof-by-contradiction that Ax-3* was
inconsistent. Then one could identify a proof P of⊥whose Gödel number(P) is the smallest Gödel number of a Herbrand
proof of⊥ from Ax-3*. We will now construct from P an alternate Herbrand proof R of⊥where (R) < (P). The formal
construction of such a Rwill sufﬁce for our proof by contradiction to reach its desired end because such a R cannot possibly
exist (on account of P’s minimality property).
2 The results of Wrathall [56] have been noted by Hájek–Pudlák [13] to imply that every LinH function [13,21,56] has a 0 encoding. Using a slightly
different “
−
0 ”notation, the results from Appendices C and D of [49] explained how this result would imply that the each of Prf
D
α (t, p), ExPrf
D
α (h, t, p) and
SubstPrfDα (g, t, p) have “
−
0 ”encodings. Since the
R
0 class of formalae is broader than
−
0 , these formulae must also have
R
0 encodings.
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Our strategy is to use Theorem 2 to construct R from P. Theorem 2 is relevant to Ax-3* because all the formal axiom
sentences of Ax-3* are assuredly R1 sentences (see Footnote
3 for the justiﬁcation of this claim). In such a context, we may
apply Theorem 2 to conclude that for some B < (P), at least one of the axiom-sentences of Ax-3* must fail to be a
B-Bounded valid R1 sentence. Moreover, it is obvious that all the axioms of Ax-3 possess an unbounded level of validity
(i.e. they are B-Bounded valid for all possible B). Hence, these two observations imply Diag(Ax-3) fails to be B-bounded valid
(simplybecause someaxiom fromAx-3*must fail to beB-boundedvalid, andDiag(Ax-3) is the only available axiombelonging
to Ax-3* that is not also a member of Ax-3.)
The latter observation, combined with Diag(Ax-3)’s deﬁnition implies (see Footnote 4) that some R with (R) < B must
be another proof of ⊥. Hence our last two inequalities certainly imply that (R) < B < (P) . This ﬁnishes our proof-by-
contradiction because P’s previously presumed minimality has been contradicted by R. 
Remark 2. Our discussion in this section had assumed that the terms T in a R0’s formula’s bounded quantiﬁers included
only theMaximum function symbol. The results of Theorem 4would actually also hold if these quantiﬁers were also permitted
to include the Addition function symbol. (The only reason our discussion had omitted the possibility that both the addition
and maximum function symbols appear in theR0 formula φ’s bounded quantiﬁers in Eq. (2) was for the sake of simplifying
the presentation.)
Remark 3. The attached Appendix B discusses a yet further reason why Theorem 4 is of interest. The anonymous referee had
suggested we add this appendix to the current paper. Its methodologies are related to Kołodziejczyk’s observation [18,19]
that semantic tableaux and Herbrand deduction can sometimes have an exponential difference in their proof lengths. The
purpose of Appendix B is to sketch how one can generalize [55]’s results for Ax-1 and Ax-2 to establish that Ax-3 is also
a threshold for the semantic tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. In a context where Theorem 4 had
established the polar opposite result for Ax-3 under Herbrand deduction, this contrast is, of course, quite interesting.
5. Discussion of signiﬁcance of results
A comparison between our research and the prior research of Kreisel–Takeuti and Pudlák [22,31,39] was postponed until
the closing part of this current article because the results from Sections 3 and 4 were needed to precede this discussion.
In this section, S(x)will denote the “successor” operation that maps the integer x onto x + 1. A formula ϕ(x) is called [13]
a Deﬁnable Cut for an axiom system α iff α can prove:
ϕ(0) AND ∀ x { ϕ(x) ⇒ ϕ[S(x)] } AND ∀ x ∀ y < x { ϕ(x) ⇒ ϕ(y) } (34)
Avery extensive literature [1,3,6,10,12,13,16,20,21,25,27–33,35,37,42–46,50,51]has studiedDeﬁnable cuts.Wehavepublished
two 6-page summaries of this literature in the review chapters of our articles [52,54]. (Also, Pudlak’s full-length survey article
[32] offers an excellent review of the work done in this subject prior to approximately 1990.)
All axioms systems, strictly weaker than Peano Arithmetic, contain some deﬁnable cut that is not provably equivalent to
the full set of integers. In the proof-theory literature, the deﬁnition of a “Deﬁnable Cut” (see [13]) is formally unrelated to
Gentzen’s notion of a sequent calculus deductive “cut rule”, despite their very similar sounding names.
Let    denote  ’s Gödel number, and PrfDα (t, p) denote that p is a proof of the theorem t from the axiom system α
using the deduction method D. Also, let ϕ(x) denote a deﬁnable cut. Let us say that an axiom system α can recognize its
Cut-LocalizedD-consistency under ϕ(x) iff α can formally prove:
∀ p { ϕ(p) ⇒ ¬ PrfDα ( 0 = 1 , p ) } (35)
Pudlák [31] proved that no consistent extension of the Tarski–Mostowski–Robinson [41] system Q can prove the validity of
Eq. (35) for any deﬁnable cutwhenD denotes either Hilbert deduction or a Gentzen sequent calculus systemwith a deductive
cut rule.
At the same time, the literature about Deﬁnable Cuts has also deﬁned some circumstances where (35) is provable from α
when for exampleDdenotes either semantic tableaux orHerbranddeduction. The strongest result of this typewasdiscovered
by Pudlák [31]. For both Herbrand and semantic tableaux deduction, [31] showed that it is possible to construct a deﬁnable
cut ϕ(p)where α can prove the validity of Eq. (35)’s Cut-Localized D-consistency property when α is an axiom system with
ﬁnite cardinality that satisﬁes a relatively minor additional constraint called “sequentiality”.
A second class of boundary-like exceptions to the Second Incompleteness can be constructed via the “Cut Free Analysis”
(CFA) systems of Kreisel and Takeuti [22,39]. It has consisted of a Second Order Logic generalization of the cut-free version
of Gentzen’s Sequent Calculus that is able to prove some types of versions of statements about its own consistency.
3 Theorem 3 implies that the Diag(Ax-3) axiom of Ax-3* has aR1 structure, and Section 2’s deﬁnition of Ax-3 implies that all the other axiom-sentences
belonging to Ax-3 are certainly alsoR1.
4 The strictly formalistic deﬁnition of Diag(Ax-3) as the entity “(N)” (using a self-reference principle) can be found in the last sentence of Theorem 3’s
proof. The syntax of its Eq. (33) implies that if Diag(Ax-3) fails to be B-Bounded valid then another proof R must assuredly exist for the sentence ⊥ with
(R) < B .
1086 Dan E. Willard / Information and Computation 207 (2009) 1078–1093
The work of Kreisel and Takeuti [22,39] had chronologically preceded most of the literature about Deﬁnable Cuts. There is
a fascinating partial analogy between the perspectives of these two approaches. This is because the Kreisel–Takeuti papers
[22,39] can be viewed as using an analog of Eq. (35) in an implicit manner. Thus [22] employs a set of objects, which we shall
call I, that includes all the standard integers plus plausibly non-standard integers that can represent a proof of a contradiction.
It then uses I to construct a subset of it, called “N”, which can be viewed as a representation of the natural numbers.
(More precisely, the pages 16 and 17 of [22] construct N from I in this manner by employing Dedekind’s and Zermelo’s
inductive second-order logic deﬁnitions of thenatural numbers. They thus formally treat theDedekindandZermelo inductive
deﬁnitions of N as an analog of ϕ(p) in Eq. (35)’s Cut-Localized D-Consistency statement.)
A question which then naturally arises is whether or not one can also develop some types of axiom systems which can
prove their own consistency without relying upon Eq. (35)’s “Cut-Localized D-consistency” machinery (or [22]’s analog of
it for a second-order generalization of a Gentzen Cut-Free logic.) Such an approach is desirable because one would ideally
like to characterize the properties of the natural numbers directly — instead of being required to view them as a subset of a
potentially larger set of objects, called I.
It is indeed possible tomake someprogress in this area by using a third approach, relying upon theDiagonal(α,D) sentence,
which was formally deﬁned by the Theorem 3. (Analogs of this Diagonal(α,D) sentence have also been used in several of
our previous papers [47,49,52,54] in some contexts quite different from the paradigm outlined by Theorem 4.)
It is difﬁcult to make more detailed comparisons between the partial exceptions to Gödel’s Second Theorem that use our
Diagonal(α,D) sentence with the methods of Kreisel–Takeuti and Pudlák [22,31,39]. Each technique has its own distinct
separate advantage. There also appears to be no natural way to hybridize these techniques. (The point is that each of these
different methodologies is looking at a different type of problem setting, where a different form of solution method is
available.)
In particular, our research has treated the sentence Diagonal(α,D) as an axiom of α while the Kreisel–Takeuti and Pudlák
papers [22,31,39] treat their analogs of Eq. (35) as derived theorems. In this context, it is very natural for a reader to inquire
whether is is preferable to treat an “I am consistent” statement as a theorem rather than as an axiom of the system α that
generates it?
There is surprisingly no easy answer to this question. For instance, if one’s goal is to attempt to return to the original
objectives of Hilbert’s consistency program, then the Kreisel–Takeuti and Pudlák approaches are quite signiﬁcant because
they indicate some respects inwhich an axiom system can indeed formally prove at least a reduced versions of its consistency
statement. However from an alternate perspective, there is a substantial difﬁculty with approaches that treat the statement
“I am consistent” and its analogs as a theorem rather than as an axiom. The difﬁculty arises when the relevant systems do not
have an operating modus ponens or Gentzen-like cut rule (as is the case with the axiom systems of [22,31]). Such systems
cannot draw inferences when they prove a theorem essentially declaring that “I am consistent”. However, a similar such
difﬁculty does not affect the self-justifying axiom systems in our earlier papers [47,49,52,53,54] or in Theorem 4 because
they treat the statement Diagonal(α,D) as a formal axiom rather than as a theorem. (The point here is that axiom-sentences,
quite unlike theoremsentences, canbepermissiblyusedas intermediate steps togenerateotherdeductionsunder the inference
rules of semantic tableaux, the cut-free sequent calculus and/or Herbrand deduction — thus causing their presence to have
stronger implications.)
Thus, there are quite different insights that arise from systems that treat variants of the “I am consistent” statement as
an axiom instead of as a theorem (because of the different connotations these two approaches carry). Neither approach is
uniformly preferable over the other. Another difference between our research and the investigations of Kreisel–Takeuti and
Pudlák [22,31,39] is that the sentence Diagonal(α,D) declares the consistency of α in a global sense whereas Eq. (35) refers
only to the localized subset of integers that lie within the domain of ϕ. (In the case of Kreisel–Takeuti second-order logic
system, Eq. (35) is used implicitly on the pages 16 and 17 of [22] to draw the distinction between what we have called I and
N earlier in this section.)
When one compares our results in Theorem 4 or in our earlier papers [47,49,52,53,54] with the research of Kreisel–Takeuti
and Pudlák [22,31,39], it is best to remember that Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem precludes an exception to it
from becoming too powerful. Thus, it is possible to develop different types of partial evasions to the Second Incompleteness
Theorem around its periphery that shed different types of useful new perspectives. However, it is awkward to attempt to
hybridize these different types of partial evasions into a stronger uniform evasion. This is because if such a hybrid combined
the strengthsof thedifferent approachesX,YandZ, then itwouldbecomeso strong that itsproperties couldpotentially violate
the statement of Gödel’s historic result. Thus, there are trade-offs where different types of useful insights, stemming from
different approaches (that are difﬁcult to hybridize into one uniﬁed methodology), examine somewhat different problems
and produce different new perspectives.
Part of the reason that Ax-3’s evasion of the Herbrandized version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem is interesting
is that it is known that further improvements upon this result are very difﬁcult to obtain. Thus, Adamowicz–Zbierski [1,3]
showed that I0 + 1 was unable to verify its Herbrand consistency, Willard [48,50,55] modiﬁed this result to show the
Second Incompleteness Theorem applied also to Ax-1 and Ax-2’s versions of I0’s axiomatization under semantic tableaux
deduction, and Salehi [33] extended some of the earlier results from [1,3,48,50] to develop some further incompleteness
results for I0 under Herbrand deduction. Thus in a context where several earlier papers have explored types of results
where the Second Incompleteness Theorem holds for encodings for I0 and its cousins , it is surprising that the current
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article has documented a paradigmwhere at least the Ax-3 encoding for I0 evades the Herbrandized version of the Second
Incompleteness Theorem.
6. Broader perspectives
Some added notation is useful so that we can examine Theorem 4’s results from a broader perspective. Let us say a formula
 isR1 when it can bewritten in the form ¬ where isR1. Some other fairly conventional notation is that a sentencewill
be calledRk+1 when it can bewritten in the form ∀ v1 ∀ v2 ... ∀ vn φ(v1, v2, . . . , vn)where φ(v1, v2, . . . , vn) is aRk formula.
Likewise, a sentence will be calledRk+1 when it can be written as ∃ v1 ∃ v2 ... ∃ vn φ(v1, v2, . . . , vn)where φ(v1, v2, . . . , vn)
is aRk formula. Also, a sentence will be said to be Level−k if it is eitherRk orRk .
Deﬁnition 7. LetH denote a sequence of ordered pairs (t1, p1), (t2, p2), ... (tn, pn), where pi is aHerbrand proof of the theorem
ti. For an arbitrary integer k ≥ 1, this list H will be deﬁned to be a Herb−k proof of a theorem T from the axiom system α
iff T = tn and also:
(1) Each axiom in pi’s proof is either one of t1, t2, ... , ti−1 or comes from α.
(2) Each of the “intermediately derived theorems” t1, t2, ... , tn−1 must lie within the Level-k class of sentences.
Intuitively, Herb−k deduction can be viewed as an extension of Herbrand deduction that contains a type of Gentzen-like
deductive cut rule for Level-k sentences.
The Deﬁnition 7’s machinery is useful for helping to describe both the maximal generalizations as well as inherent limita-
tions of Section 4’s formalism. Thus using Deﬁnition 7’s notation, one can establish the following two tightly complementary
negative and positive results:
I. There exists a logically validR1 sentence denoted as such that no consistent axiom system can contain as an axiom
and prove a theorem afﬁrming its own consistency under Herb−2 deduction.
II. In contrast for each consistent axiom system A, there exists a consistent axiom system I(A) that can prove all A ’s R1
theorems and recognize its own consistency under Herb−1 deduction.
In other words, Items I and II indicate that there is a fundamental difference between Herb−1 and Herb−2 deduction.
Thus, Herb−1 deduction allows for a type of robust evasion of the Second Incompleteness Theorem under a formalism that
contains a type of limited Gentzen-style cut rule. However, Result-II precludes this evasion from becoming too strong.
We will not prove results I and II here because each has a rather long proof. Also, partial analogs of these two prior results
have appeared in our prior work. Thus, [51] and [52] have used the term Tab−k deduction to refer to a construct similar to
Herb−k deduction except for the following two changes:
(1) Under Tab−k deduction, the proofs p1 , p2 , . . . , pn associated with the sequence (t1, p1), (t2, p2), . . . , (tn, pn), are
semantic tableaux proofs instead of Herbrand proofs.













k sentences can be intuitively
viewed as being roughly analogous to Rk and 
R
k sentences — except that they contain no multiplication function
symbol. (They instead use a relation primitiveM(x, y, z) to treat multiplication as a 3-way relation.)
In essence Item I’s result can be viewed as being analogous to [51]’s main theorem. Similarly, Item II’s result can be viewed as
following from a rather natural hybridization of [52]’s main result with the machinery that we had developed in Section 4.
For further details about this material, the reader should examine [51,52]’s generic formalisms. The reason we had slightly
changed the topic from semantic tableaux to Herbrand deduction in the current paper is because Herbrand deduction and its
Herb−1 generalization possess one interesting quality that semantic tableaux and Tab−1 deduction simply do not possess.
This is that the Ax-3 encoding of the axiom system I0 is an anti-threshold to the Herbrandized (and also Herb−1) versions
of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. However, the similar anti-threshold effect does not apply also to semantic tableaux
deduction (as is explained in Appendix B). Thus, the Herb−1 deduction method will support certain types of evasions of the
Second Incompleteness Theorem that have no analogs under Tab−1 deduction. (The interested reader should also examine
Kołodziejczyk work [18,19], which observed how semantic tableaux and Herbrand-styled proofs can sometimes have an
exponential difference in their lengths.)
In essence the over-all goal of our research, in the current paper and in the previous papers [47–55], has been to attempt
to sharpen the academic community’s understanding of the meaning of the Second Incompleteness Theorem, by exploring
both its maximal generalizations and permitted allowed boundary-case exceptions. We plan to prepare a new article about
this subject in the near future, describing the underlying philosophical motivation for much of this research. One must
clearly approach this subject matter carefully because the many generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem
are seemingly more signiﬁcant than its occasional boundary-case exceptions. The reason that the partial exceptions to the
Second Incompleteness Theorem should not be ignored is because Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem is often regarded as the
paramount discovery of 20th century mathematics. It thus beckons the academic community to explore both its maximum
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generalizations and possible boundary-case exceptions, so that an understanding of the full meaning of its historic result
can be sharpened and made more precise. Within such a limited-but-precise framework, the anomalous behavior of Ax-3,
documented in this article, should be of scholarly interest.
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Appendix A. The proof for Theorem 2
This appendix will explain in further detail how Deﬁnitions 3–6 and Lemma 2 may be used to prove Theorem 2. Our
discussion will begin with one further deﬁnition and two further lemmas.
Deﬁnition 8. Consider the possibility that is the prenex normal sentence, whose open part is formalized by ψ˜ (x1, y1, ...,
xn, yn), shown in Eq. (36) and whose Skolemized normalized form is illustrated by Eq. (37).
∀ x1 ∃ y1 ∀ x2 ∃ y2 .... ∀ xn ∃ yn ψ˜ (x1, y1, ..., xn, yn) (36)
∀x1 ∀x2 .... ∀xn ψ˜ [ x1 , fψ1 (x1) , x2 , fψ2 (x1, x2), ... xn , fψn (x1, x2, ..., xn) ] (37)
For any B ≥ 1, Eqs. (36) and (37) will be called a B-Bounded Good Skolemization iff one can deﬁne (37)’s Skolem functions
f1 , f

2 , ... f

n so they satisfy both Deﬁnition 3’s B-Bounded requirement (see Footnote
5) and Eq. (38) under the standard
model of the natural numbers.
∀ x1 < B ∀ x2 < B .... ∀ xn < B
ψ˜ [ x1 , fψ1 (x1) , x2 , fψ2 (x1, x2) . . . , xn , fψn (x1, x2 . . . , xn) ] (38)
Likewise, we will say an axiom system α has a B-Bounded Good Skolemization iff all its axioms are so Skolemized.
Lemma 3. Using the notation conventions from Deﬁnitions 4 and 8, every B-Bounded Valid R1 sentence can be rewritten into a
logically equivalent form that has a B-Bounded Good Skolemization.
Proof. Follows immediately from the deﬁnitions of Bounded Validity and Bounded Good Skolemizations (i.e. see Deﬁnitions
4 and 8). 
Remark 4. From Lemma 3, one can gain a further intuitive appreciation of the role that Deﬁnition 3 will play in our proof
of Theorem 2. This lemma indicated that every B-Bounded Valid R1 sentence had a B-Bounded Good Skolemization, and
Deﬁnition 8 indicated that such skolemizations satisﬁed Deﬁnition 3’s requirement that no such invoked Skolem function
would grow faster than themultiplication primitive. Such slow-growth Skolem functions characterize Ax-3 (but not also the
Ax-1 and Ax-2 systems). The intuitive reason for this distinction is that the paradigm in the Footnote 5 of Deﬁnition 8 applies
only to Ax-3.
Lemma 4. Using the notation conventions from Deﬁnitions 5, 6 and 8, suppose that α is a canonical arithmetic system consisting
of prenex sentences with B-Bounded Good Skolemizations and that  satisﬁes the Conventional Encoding property. Then any
Herbrand proof P of ⊥ from the axiom system α will satisfy (P) > B .
Proof-by-contradiction. Consider the contrary possibility that the inequality(P) > B failed and that P is a Herbrand-proof
of ⊥ from the system α where(P) ≤ B. We shall denote this inequality as *** .
Deﬁnition 6 had indicated every term T in the proof P satisﬁes the inequality of(P) > MinG(T .) Also, Lemma 2 implied
Val(T) < MinG(T). These inequalities and *** imply that every term T in the proof P satisﬁes
Val(T) < B (39)
5 The function of Deﬁnition 3’s B-Bounded requirement is that it assures that each of Eq. (37)’s Skolem functions of f1 , f

2 , ... satisfy the constraint that
fi (x1, x2, ... , xi) ≤ Max(x1, x2, ... , xi) whenever Max(x1, x2, ... , xn) < B .
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Eq. (39) implies all the terms T1, T2, T3, ..., in the Herbrandized instances in the proof P satisfy Val(Ti) < B. The normalized
form of an instance of a Skolemized axiom is illustrated by Eq. (40). The combination of our Val(Ti) < B inequalities together
with (38)’s B-Bounded constraint on α’s axioms implies that each such instance of (40) appearing in the proof P must be
automatically valid under the standard model of the natural numbers.
ψ˜ [ T1 , fψ1 (T1) , T2 , fψ2 (T1, T2) , . . . , Tn , fψn (T1, T2, . . . , Tn) ] (40)
The latter observation completes our proof-by-contradiction because it contradicts the statement *** that had started
our proof. More precisely *** had asserted that P was a Herbrand-proof of ⊥ from the axiom system α. However, the
Footnote 6 shows that such is impossible when the last sentence of the preceding paragraph indicated that each instance of
(40)’s Skolemized axiom is valid under the standard model of the natural numbers. 
Finishing the proof for Theorem 2. It is easy to combine the machineries of Lemmas 3 and 4 to complete the proof of
Theorem 2. This is because Lemma 3 had indicated that every B-Bounded ValidR1 sentence can be rewritten into a logically
equivalent form that has a B-Bounded Good Skolemization. Thus, Theorem 2 follows by simply taking such rewritten forms
of α’s axioms and then applying Lemma 4’s machinery. 
Appendix B. An analysis of Ax-3’s semantic tableaux properties
This appendix will illustrate how the methods of [55] may be extended to prove that Ax-3 satisﬁes the semantic tableaux
version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. Our discussionwill be closely related to Kołodziejczyk’s observations [18,19]
that (in the context of Buss’s Bounded Arithmetic [5]) semantic tableaux and Herbrand deduction can sometimes have an
exponential or greater difference in their proof lengths. In a context where Theorem 4 had showed that Ax-3 was an anti-
threshold underHerbrand deduction, the results in this appendix are noteworthy because they imply Ax-3 has polar opposite
qualities under semantic tableaux and Herbrand deduction.
The discussion in this abbreviated appendix will assume that the reader is familiar with [55]’s proof that Ax-1 and Ax-2
satisfy the semantic tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. We will also often rely upon the notation
convention from the second paragraph of Section 2 of [55] (which deﬁned semantic tableaux deduction’s eight elimination
rules).
It is desirable to examine a fourth axiomization for I0, called Ax-4, before considering Ax-3 because such an approach
will help make the underlying intuitions behind our methodologies easier to appreciate. In our discussion, the symbol 
will denote theR1 sentence deﬁned by Eq. (41). Ax-4 will be deﬁned to be an encoding of I0 that is identical to Ax-3 except
that it includes Eq. (41)’s added sentence. (Since Ax-3 can trivially prove the validity of Eq. (41), the Ax-4 system is clearly
logically equivalent to Ax-3. Thus while proof lengths may differ in these two axiom systems, the ﬁnal theorems that they
derive are the same.)
∀ z ∀ q ≤ z [ q*q ≤ z ⇒ ∃ r ≤ z ( r = q*q ) ] (41)
Lemma 5. The axiom system Ax-4 satisﬁes the semantic tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. (In other words
using Deﬁnition 1’s notation, Ax-4 is a “threshold for the Second Incompleteness Effect” under semantic tableaux deduction).
Proof sketch. Our justiﬁcation of Lemma 5 will employ the deﬁnition of semantic tableaux deduction that had appeared in
Section 2 of [55]. Its second paragraph listed eight elimination rules for semantic tableaux deduction. For any term s, its sixth
rule applies to bounded existential quantiﬁers appearing in expressions similar to:
∃ v ≤ s (v) (42)
For an arbitrary new constant symbol U that does not appear in the base axiom system α or in any higher node in the
semantic tableaux proof tree, this rule 6 allows Eq. (43) to be a descendant of Eq. (42)’s node.
U ≤ s ∧ (U) (43)
Also consider Eq. (44)’s universally quantiﬁed sentence.
∀ v (v) (44)
In this context for any term t which is free in, the seventh elimination rule in Section 2 of [55] indicated that a descendant
of Eq. (44)’s sentence in a semantic tableaux proof tree is allowed to be any sentence of the form (t). In particular if we
take t to be a term of the form “U*U” (where U was deﬁned in Eq. (43)) then this universal quantiﬁer elimination rule may
produce the following reduction from Eq. (44).
( U*U ) (45)
6 The point here is simply that a conjunction of Skolemized instances can produce a proof of ⊥ only when there exists no model M where all these
instances are simultaneously valid. Hence when the preceding paragraph shows that all these Skolemized instances are simultaneously valid under the
Standard Model of the Natural Numbers, it implies that certainly no such proof of ⊥ can feasibly exist.
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Lastly for any term sˆ, consider Eq. (46)’s sentence.
∀ v ≤ sˆ (v) (46)
In this context for any term t (again required to be free in ), the eighth elimination rule from Section 2 of [55] indicated
that Eq. (47) is allowed to be descendant of Eq. (46)’s sentence in a semantic tableaux proof.
t ≤ sˆ ⇒ (t) (47)
Since Eq. (47)’s rule for eliminating universal quantiﬁers can apply to any term t (free in), it is applicable to the case where
t is a term of the form “U” where U is a new constant created by Eq. (43)’s elimination rule. In this special case, Eq. (47)’s
elimination rule can be rewritten as:
U ≤ sˆ ⇒ ( U ) (48)
In essence, onemayapply toEq. (41)n iterationsof the elimination rules fromEqs. (43), (45) and (48) to construct a sequence
of constants U0 , U1 , U2 , . . . Un such that U0 = 2 and Ui+1 = Ui*Ui . (The Footnote 7 summarizes the structure of the
i-th round of these n iterations.) In a formal sense, these n iterations may thus be simulated by a fragment of a semantic
tableaux proof tree, denoted as F , where all the branches of F are closed except for one branch, called the pivotal branch,
which contains the parameter symbols of U0 , U1 , U2 , . . . Un together with a collection of sentences, appearing in linear
order, asserting that U0 = 2 and Ui+1 = Ui*Ui.
Hence this “pivotal branch” of F will imply that Un = 22n . Moreover since the fragment F will have only O(n) nodes, it
will establish the existence of a number Un = 22n , whose binary encoding has a 2n length that is much larger than F ’s
length.
The above invariant is essentially all that we need to generalize [55]’s semantic tableaux version of the Second Incomplete-
ness Theorem so that it also applies to Ax-4. (We obviously have omitted many details here. However, they are relatively
straightforward extensions of [55]’s methodologies because the super-exponential growth property, established by the
prior paragraphs, opens an avenue for introducing [55]’s proof techniques, whose formal details are too lengthy to be fully
duplicated during this abbreviated proof sketch.) 
The remainder of this appendix will sketch how Lemma 5’s variant of the semantic tableaux version of the Second Incom-
pleteness Theorem can be extended from the axiom system Ax-4 to Ax-3 (itself). Before doing so, we wish to introduce one
further preliminary lemma.
Lemma 6. The axiom system Ax-4 satisﬁes the same anti-threshold property for Herbrandized deduction as did Ax-3 (in
Theorem 4 ).
Proof sketch. Every aspect of the proof of Theorem 4 (for Ax-3) does generalize also for Ax-4’s paradigm. This is because
Theorem 4’s proof generalizes for any extension of Ax-3 that consists of a ﬁnite number of additional logically valid R1
sentences. Thus, if α denotes any such an extension of Ax-3 and if α* denotes the extension of α which contains one
additional R1 sentence, asserting the consistency of α
* (analogous to Theorem 3’s Diagonal(α,D) sentence), then every
aspect of our prior analysis of Ax-3* applies also to α*. Thus using the same reasoning as before, it follows that α (and hence
also Ax-4) must be anti-thresholds relative to Herbrand deduction. 
The combination of Lemmas 5 and 6 already shows that semantic tableaux and Herbrand deduction have polar opposite
threshold properties with respect to Ax-4. (This is because the latter satisﬁes the semantic tableaux version of the Second
Incompleteness Theorem, but it does not also satisfy its Herbrandized variant.) The same pair of polar opposite qualities
also applies to I0’s Ax-3 axiomization. However, the proof that Ax-3 satisﬁes the semantic tableaux version of the Second
Incompleteness Theorem is substantially more complicated than Lemma 5’s analogous result for Ax-4.
The ﬁnal goal in this appendix will thus be to explain how one may incrementally revise Lemma 5’s proof-analysis for
Ax-4 so that a similar incompleteness property also applies to Ax-3. In our discussion, ψ˜ (v) will denote the following R0
formula, which is free only in v:
∀ q ≤ v [ q*q ≤ v ⇒ ∃ r ≤ v ( r = q*q ) ] (49)
In this notation, the sentence  that constituted Ax-4’s one additional R1 axiom-sentence (deﬁned in Eq. (41)) can be
rewritten as:
∀ v ψ˜ (v) (50)
Note that Ax-3, unlike Ax-4, does not contain Eq. (50)’sR1 sentence as an axiom of its formalism. However using an analog
of “passive induction” from our paper [55], we will show Ax-3 contains a counterpart of Eq. (50) within its inductive schema
that has comparable properties.
7 The i-th iteration of this process will have z, q and r from Eq. (41) be replaced by, respectively, Ui*Ui , Ui and Ui+1 via the elimination rules from,
respectively, Eqs. (45), (48) and (43) to produce an essentially thrice-revised form of Eq. (41) which implies that Ui+1 = Ui*Ui .
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In particular, let ψ︸︷︷︸(z) denote the following
R
0 formula:
{ ψ˜ (0) ∧ ∀y ≤ z [ ψ˜ (y) ⇒ ψ˜ (y′) ] } ⇒ ∀y ≤ z ψ˜ (y) (51)
Then Eq. (52) represents an encoding of one of Ax-3’s induction axioms.
∀ z ψ︸︷︷︸(z) (52)
In order to explain the signiﬁcance of this added notation, let again denote Eq. (41)’s axiom-sentence (which we saw was
identical to Eq. (50)’s sentence except that the latter uses a slightly different notation). Also, let* denote Eq. (52)’s sentence.
In this notation,* can be viewed as a cousin of which has the property that although is not an axiom of Ax-3, its cousin
* is a formal axiom of Ax-3.
The latter property is important because we need a vehicle for formally translating proofs from the Ax-4 system to proofs
in the Ax-3 system. Since  is the only axiom belonging to Ax-4 which is not also in Ax-3, Eq. (51)’s formal counterpart of
it, called*, will provide a means for doing this translation. The implications of this translation mechanism is described by
our next lemma.
Lemma 7. Let denote an arbitrary theorem that is proven from the axiom system Ax-4 under a semantic tableaux proof T that
consists of n applications of the ∀ elimination to rule to Eq. (50)’s axiom-sentence of  . For some term ti , let us assume that the
i-th such application of this rule replaces Eq. (50) with the reduced sentence of
ψ˜ ( ti ) (53)
Then for a constant k whose value is entirely independent of n , one can construct a proof T* of the same theorem  from the
axiom system Ax-3 where the difference between the number of node-sentences appearing in the proofs of T and of T* is bounded
by the quantity of kn .
Proof. The justiﬁcation of Lemma 7 is fairly straightforward. On each occasion where T ’s proof contains a node similar to
Eq. (53), the comparable structure in T* will replace this sentence with a tree-fragment that consists of the following four
components:
(1) An initial node-sentence of the form (54) (which is justiﬁed because it is an instance of Eq. (52)’s axiom-sentence of
*).
ψ︸︷︷︸( ti ) (54)
(2) A branch separationwill appear directly below Eq. (54)’s node that consists of the two sibling sentences of (55) and (56).
In light of Eq. (51)’s deﬁnition of ψ︸︷︷︸ , this binary separation is justiﬁed by the semantic tableaux rule for eliminating
the ⇒ symbol (which was formalized by Item 4 from the second paragraph of [55]’s Section 2).
¬ { ψ˜ (0) ∧ ∀y ≤ ti [ ψ˜ (y) ⇒ ψ˜ (y′) ] } (55)
∀y ≤ ti ψ˜ (y) (56)
(3) Since Ax-3 can prove Eq. (41)’s sentence of as a theorem, it is trivial to establish that for some ﬁxed constant k1 which
does not depend on i, one may insert a closed semantic tableaux proof of length k1 under Eq. (55)’s sentence, which
accomplishes the desired effect of showing that Eq. (55) is inherently contradictory.
(4) Usingonemore time [55]’s semantic tableaux rules for eliminating theboundeduniversal quantiﬁers and the⇒ symbol,
one may easily insert a branch below Eq. (56) that ends with the pair of sibling sentences given in Eqs. (57) and (58)
below. Moreover, it is evident that Eq. (57) is inherently contradictory. Thus for some ﬁxed constant k2 (which again
does not depend on i ), the net consequence of this step will be to consist of a sequence of k2 node-sentences that
includes the sentences given in Eqs. (57) and (58) and closes the proof-tree that descends from Eq. (57) with the desired
forced contradiction.
¬ ( ti ≤ ti ) (57)
ψ˜ ( ti ) (58)
Let k denote a constant that equals the quantity of k1 + k2 + 3. Then each iteration of the above 4-step procedure will
replace Eq. (53)’s sentence with a subtree fragment consisting of k new sentences. Note that the ﬁnal sentence at the end of
each such iteration (given in Eq. (58)) contains the identical logical statement as was given in Eq. (53)’s initial sentence. Since
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all the other branches of our new sub-structure are closed and since Eqs. (53) and (58) are identical to each other, it follows
that after we ﬁnish performing n iterations of the above process, introducing kn new sentences, our new revised semantic
tableaux tree will prove the theorem from Ax-3 instead of Ax-4. 
Theorem 5. The axiom system Ax-3 (similar to Ax-4) satisﬁes the semantic tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness
Theorem. (Thus using Deﬁnition 1’s notation, Ax-3 is also a “threshold for the Second Incompleteness Effect” under semantic
tableaux deduction).
Proof sketch. For the sake of brevity, we will only outline the intuition behind Theorem 5’s proof. It will be essentially a
consequence of the combination of Lemmas 5 and 7.
In particular, the core idea behind Lemma 5’s analysis of Ax-4 was to employ a sequence of n iterated applications of
Eq. (41)’s axiom of  so as to construct a formal sequence of constants U0 , U1 , U2 , . . . , Un such that U0 = 2 and
Ui+1 = Ui*Ui . By Lemma 7, the precisely identical sequence of U0 , U1 , U2 , . . . , Un can be constructed from Ax-3 using
only kn additional sentences, for some ﬁxed constant k whose value is independent of n .
Since Un represents the quantity of 2
2n whose binary encoding has a length of 2n , this binary length is clearly much
larger than kn as n approaches of inﬁnity. As a result of this exponential difference in lengths, it is relatively routine to revise
Lemma 5’s proof of the semantic tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem for Ax-4 so that it may also apply
to Ax-3. (The remaining details are analogous to the constructions that we used in [50,55] and are omitted for the sake of
brevity.) 
Summing up what has been done in this appendix: We have outlined abbreviated proofs showing that the Ax-3 and
Ax-4 encodings for I0 satisfy the semantic tableaux versions of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. We visited this topic
twice because the result is easier to establish for Ax-4, although it is stronger for Ax-3. (The latter is stronger because Ax-3
contains one less axiom-sentence thanAx-4.) Both our results for Ax-3 andAx-4 are interesting because these formalisms are
anti-thresholds for the Herbrandized version of the Second Incompleteness while they are thresholds when the paradigm is
changed to focus upon semantic tableaux style deduction.
We close this appendix by once again reminding the reader that a different type of axiomatic setting where semantic
tableaux andHerbrandized proofs have a sharp difference in lengthwas formalized by Kołodziejczyk in [18,19]. (In particular,
Kołodziejczyk [18,19] focused his discussion on Buss’s bounded arithmetic of [5].)
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